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Summary. Genetic science has provided new knowl-
edge that has the potential to reduce ‘race’ discrimina-
tion. This includes findings that around 95% of human 
genetic variability is present within any population; and 
that most human traits are influenced by a complex 
combination of many genetic and environmental fac-
tors. Despite this knowledge, racially discriminatory 
practices persist internationally, including segregation; 
unfair sentencing; state surveillance of children; and 
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involuntary sterilisation. Moreover, there is an emerg-
ing risk that DNA may be used to propel harmful dis-
criminatory practices. For example, new ‘DNA-based’ 
groups may emerge in the context of polygenic predic-
tion – aggregating multiple genetic risks into individu-
als’ combined risk indexes. Such DNA-based groups 
could be viewed as ‘new races’ - adding yet another 
category to the already heterogenous definition of 
‘race’. This paper reviews the genetic advances directly 
relevant to, and their impact on, ‘race’ and other group 
discrimination; and assesses current UK and in-
ternational discrimination practices and effectiveness of 
the laws in place prior to and in the genomic era. The 
paper concludes that current laws provide insufficient 
protection from ‘race’ and other group discrimination 
and still reflect people’s beliefs in entrenched differ-
ences between ‘races’. The paper asserts that the very 
use of the term ‘race’ in equality legislation is problem-
atic due to inconsistencies in definition across key leg-
islations; and history of its association with domina-
tion. Justice systems must update laws to reflect current 
genetic knowledge and to address existing and emerg-
ing risks of discrimination. 
Keywords: Discrimination law; race discrimination; genetics and 
race; DNA based group discrimination; equality legislation; genet-
ics and race 
Genetic science has produced a vast amount of knowledge about 
human traits. This knowledge has the power to bring both great 
benefits and harm to people. Numerous discrimination practices 
have been based on the assumed biological / genetic differences 
among groups – so called ‘races’. This paper argues that the risks 
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of such discrimination remain high in the genomic era, which has 
started in 21st century with the completion of the Human Genome 
Project (Guttmacher and Collins 2003). The paper highlights the 
problems with the definition of ‘race’. The paper outlines the exist-
ing UK law on ‘race’ discrimination, as well as relevant in-
ternational instruments, and considers their effectiveness in prac-
tice. The paper then highlights how genetic science can be used to 
minimise race and other group discrimination, but that at the same 
time may introduce new challenges for justice systems, such as 
discrimination against DNA-based groups. Such groups may, for 
example, include people who have similar polygenic scores linked 
to particular traits and/or the same genetic markers for particular 
conditions. Using an interdisciplinary perspective of law and ge-
netics, the paper identifies what is required from justice systems to 
update laws to alleviate such risks.  
Discrimination on perceived biological differences  
History of discrimination  
Societies have used heredity for centuries as a predictor of an indi-
vidual’s qualities. Relying on lineage, for example, people have 
selected partners, employees and social circles. People have long 
known that something biological transmits from generation to gen-
eration within families. Today we know that what is transmitted is 
DNA, the genome. However, our understanding of genetic trans-
mission has been limited, leading to incorrect views about genetic 
differences between groups and to discrimination of groups. Group 
discrimination is based on many characteristics, including colour, 
nationality, ethnicity, religion, class, caste, gender and other exist-
ing and perceived differences.  
Discrimination based on hypothesised biological differences be-
tween groups has led to numerous catastrophes, including the fol-
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lowing well known genocides: the murder of up to 1.5 million Ar-
menians in 1915; of around 6 million Jews and hundreds of thou-
sands of Roma in the Second World War; and more recently (1992-
95), of around 250,000 Bosnians (genocidewatch.com) (Derderian 
2005; Paulsson 2011; ushmm.org n.d.). Other horrific group dis-
crimination practices include, the centuries-long segregation of 
black people; and the persistent discrimination of minority ethnic 
groups, such as the Roma people.  
Another example of group (class) discrimination is that of eu-
genic practices that used genetics to support its agenda (Lombardo 
1985). The eugenic movement, which originated in England, advo-
cated restricting birth within groups considered genetically inferi-
or, targeting immigrants, minorities and poor people (Andrews, 
Mehlman, and Rothstein 2015; Bouche and Rivard 2014; Daniel J. 
Kevles 1985; Kevles 1999; UNICEF 2017). It was erroneously be-
lieved that undesirable traits (e.g. feeblemindedness, criminality 
and alcoholism) were passed on in families in a simple way, and 
therefore it was thought possible to improve the genetic pool of the 
population by ‘breeding out’ disease and intellectual weakness. 
The father of Eugenics, Francis Galton, proposed that ‘…as a new 
race can be obtained in animals and plants, … with moderate care 
in preventing the more faulty members of the flock from breeding, 
so a race of gifted men might be obtained… .’ ((Galton 1869) p 
64). Although Galton did not propose sterilisation to improve race, 
later millions of people were forcefully sterilised. These forced 
sterilisations were conducted in the name of ‘improving race’ and 
alleviating the ‘burden’ that the poor, disabled and mentally ill 
‘impose’ on society. Reported numbers of forcefully sterilised peo-
ple, include around 64000 in the US; 60000 in Sweden; and 3.5 
million in Germany (Andrews et al. 2015; Daniel J. Kevles 1985; 
UNICEF 2017). 
In the USA, the Eugenics Records Office (ERO) used unreliable 
data to promote eugenic practices leading to passing of Eugenic 
laws. In the most damaging case in the history of Eugenics – Buck 
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v Bell 1927 – the US Supreme Court upheld the sterilisation of a 
poor woman of average intelligence on the ground of ‘imbecility’, 
paving the path for millions of sterilisations (Burrus 2016; Georgia 
State University 1927; Lombardo 1985). For example, 20 states 
passed eugenic sterilisation statutes in the following 10 years, with 
the total of 33 US States ennacting sterilisation laws (Andrews et 
al. 2015; Lombardo 2011; SSHRCC n.d.). The Buck v. Bell case 
has never been overturned.  
The eugenic movement spread across the world, and included a 
number of international organisations and societies which them-
selves had disagreements on what methods can and should be used 
to ‘improve’ a human population (stock) (Macuglia 2014). In the 
UK, where the first International Eugenics Conference was held in 
1912, eugenics was supported by political leaders (Brignell 2010). 
The UK prime minister, Winston Churchill, for example, is report-
ed to have warned that ‘The multiplication of the feeble-minded… 
is a very terrible danger to the race’ (Akomolafe 2016; Larson 
2017); and another parliamentarian is reported to have described 
disabled people as ‘human vermin…’ (Brignell 2010; Chitty 2009; 
Sewell 2009).  
Using the inferior race justification, laws were passed in the 
USA (e.g. Immigration Act, 1924) to minimise or stop immigrant 
intakes from a number of nationalities, whose communities were 
growing large enough to require seats in government (Ager and 
Hansen 2017; Higham 2002; Ogletree 2000; Stolerman 2017). The 
set intakes of immigrants were 82% for Northern and Western Eu-
ropeans; 14% for Southern and Eastern Europeans (e.g. Italians, 
Slavs and Greeks); and 4% for the rest of the world (Ogletree 
2000). This policy/law remained in force throughout the Second 
World War, at a time when the nationalities allocated small quotas 
would have had the most need to migrate to the USA.  
The use of eugenic laws continued long after the ERO was shut 
down in 1939 - with the last eugenics laws repealed as late as 1979 
in California. Since then, the eugenic laws have been discredited 
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and eugenic practices have been banned worldwide. For example, 
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome (1997) states that 
‘discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended to 
infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and human dignity’ shall be prohibited. In addition, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1958) Article 6 states that 
‘We should all have the same level of legal protection whoever we 
are...’.  
However, there are risks that genetic information will continue to 
be misused. For example, there have been recent reports of eugenic 
practices continuing, such as sterilisations of inmates reported to 
have happened as recently as 2010 - 150 women sterilised between 
2006-2010 in the State of California (Johnson 2013). Similarly, 
sterilisations of Roma women are reported to have continued until 
2016, for example in Czech Republic (ERRC 2016). Other race 
discrimination practices based on genetics persist in other ad-
vanced economies. For example, Swedish police were found to 
keep in a secret register details of over 1000 Roma children, some 
of whom were as young as 2 years old in the form of family trees 
(Ghosh 2013; Mansel 2013; Reuters 2013). Other alarming trends 
include the family cap laws in the US – removing financial support 
for additional children for parents who were already receiving fi-
nancial assistance (Berkeley Law 2016; Dinkel 2011; Lombardo 
2011). These laws spread (in around 25 States in 2011) following 
the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcili-
ation Act (PRWORA) which gave States discretion to pass family 
cap laws (a number of States have now abolished these laws) 
(Berkeley Law 2016). Family cap laws have been criticised as 
punitive restriction to curtail poorer people’s propensity to have 
more children, which were falsely promoted as ‘as a way of min-
imising reliance on support’ and ‘solving the intractable’ problems 
of poverty (Dinkel 2011; Roberts 1997).  
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Reasons for persistent discrimination  
Discrimination on real and perceived genetic differences is a com-
plex multifactorial phenomenon. One reason for persistent discrim-
ination is that historically eugenic laws and propaganda were used 
to maintain political control – justifying continued suppression of 
black people, poor people and minority immigrants (Andrews et al. 
2015; UNICEF 2017). Commercial agenda can also exharcebate 
beliefs in racial differences. For example, the BiDil drug, having 
undersold for decades as a general drug, was rebranded as a solu-
tion for a large select ‘racial’ group (African Americans) – despite 
research showing no race/ethnic related effect (Bowser 2004; 
Brody and Hunt 2006; Hammermeister et al. 2009; Husten 2017; 
Kahn 2004).  
Another major factor is that the propensity to discriminate seems 
to be an inherent feature of the human mind, tightly linked to the 
propensity to protect one’s own group. This seemingly universal 
human trait is likely to have evolved and is shared with many 
species. This propensity can often be paradoxical, such as discrim-
ination on grounds of gender which can result in harming closest 
family members (e.g. mother, sister, wife). In turn, this universal 
propensity to discriminate creates a fear that someone or some 
group will necessarily be discriminated. In other words, people 
discriminate others in order to avoid occupying the ‘discriminated 
niche’. These and other weaknesses might help explain how ex-
treme discrimination and even genocide can occur amongst people 
of the same nation, such as that which occurred between Hutu and 
Tutsi people in Rwanda (Epstein 2017).  
Discrimination is further exacerbated by people’s tendency to 
readily accept views that support pre-conceived ideas (Gilead, 
Sela, and Maril 2018). This means that people can easily accept 
scientifically weak reports and opinions that support their estab-
lished belief in the existence of racial differences. This tendency is 
reinforced by another human weakness - the difficulty in correcting 
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fake information that was initially accepted as true, even after 
learning it was fake (De keersmaecker and Roets 2017). In addi-
tion, specific to ‘race’ discrimination, as discussed in the following 
section, the very use of the term ‘race’ in law and legal practice 
may contribute to the problem.  
Law and practice  
Problems with the term ‘race’  
The use of the term ‘race’ in equality legislation is in itself prob-
lematic. It is a term that is ‘widely recognised as a social and polit-
ical construct with a long history, originating in economic and ex-
pansionis t imperat ives and directed as legi t imising 
domination’ ((Monaghan 2013) p. 187). Various legislations at-
tempt to distance themselves from accepting the existence of ‘race’ 
– demonstrating a somewhat confused position: using the term race 
and at the same time denying the existence of racial differences. 
For example, the EU indirectly acknowledges that equality law is 
based on the misunderstanding of the meaning of the term ‘race’, 
and includes the following disclaimer in recital 6 of the EU Direc-
tive 2000/43/EC (the ‘Race Equality Directive): ‘The European 
Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of 
separate human races. The use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this Di-
rective does not imply the acceptance of such theories.’ Similarly, 
Belgian law refers to ‘alleged race’; and French law to ‘real or as-
sumed race’ (European Commission 2016). 
The term ‘race’ is also defined in many ways in domestic legisla-
tion and other international instruments, with some including eth-
nicity, colour, religion, nationality, and other features; some con-
sidering ‘race’ to be a distinct feature in its own right; and others 
using different characteristics (such as ethnic origin and ethnicity) 
interchangeably with ‘race’. For example:  
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• In the UK, the Equality Act (EA) 2010 (section 9), defines 
the term ‘race’ as encompassing ‘colour, nationality, ethnic 
or national origins’. Under EA 2010, section 9(5), the UK 
government was required to include ‘caste’ in the statutory 
definition of ‘race’, and in 2014 it was held by a Tribunal 
that ‘caste’ does fall within the definition of ‘race’ (Pyper 
2018; UKEAT 2014). 
• Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1969 (ICERD) 
defines racial discrimination to include discrimination on 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.  
• Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
1953 (ECHR) states that the enjoyment of the rights to pro-
hibition from discrimination and other rights under the 
Convention ‘shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status’.  
• The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI), a human rights monitoring body, defines ‘racial 
discrimination’ to include discrimination on the grounds of 
‘race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or 
ethnic origin’ (General Policy Recommendation No. 7).  
• The EU’s Race Equality Directive states that ‘the purpose 
of this Directive is to lay down a framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic 
origin’ (Directive 2000/43/EC).  
• The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 2007 (TFEU) 
states that ‘the Union shall aim to combat discrimination 
based on … racial or ethnic origin…’ (Article 10). 
These definitions partly overlap with the definition of ‘ethnicity’ 
provided by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has re-
cently stated that ‘ethnicity’ has ‘its origins in the idea of societal 
19
Legal Issues Journal 8(1) January 2020
groups marked in particular by common nationality, religious faith, 
language, cultural and traditional origins and background’ (CURIA 
2015).  
In the UK courts have found that discrimination of an English 
national by a Scottish employer falls under the definition of ‘racial 
discrimination’ – stating that in order to determine whether a group 
is defined by reference to ‘national origins’, there must be identifi-
able historical and geographical elements, separate from the indi-
vidual’s origins, which reveal the existence of a nation at some 
point in the history of the group (EAT 1997). 
Some countries have attempted to formulate anti-discrimination 
laws without mention of the word ‘race’. For example, Germany 
has focused only on specific grounds of discrimination such a 
xenophobia and anti-Semitism. However, this approach may lead 
to the neglect of other forms of discrimination (UN CERD 2017).  
Such inconsistent use of the term ‘race’ in equality legislation 
may partially stem from the fact that the etymology of the word is 
not clear and that it has been historically used to mean different 
things, including: ‘people of common descent’ from the 16th Cen-
tury French word ‘race’; ‘race, breed, lineage, family’, from the 
16th Century Italian word ‘razza’; and English uses varying wide-
ly, including, ‘group of people with common occupation’ (c. 1500), 
‘generation’ (1540s), and ‘tribe, nation, or people regarded as of 
common stock’ by 1560s (Online Etymology Dictionary n.d.). 
However, defining race is not simply a matter of understanding 
etymology, but rather clarifying a complex issue with implications 
for human rights of all people. As human rights is a universal issue 
it makes sense for the definition of what can constitute discrimina-
tion to be uniform in domestic jurisdictions across the globe. Over-
all therefore the issue of the use of the term ‘race’ has not been re-
solved and more work is needed to achieve a satisfactory solution.  
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Effectiveness of legal protection against race discrimination  
In the 1960s there was a categorical shift in the UK and the US in 
the protection of people against ‘racial’ discrimination when laws 
were introduced which: prohibited discrimination on grounds of 
race in public places (segregation), in voting, in housing and other 
civil rights; and invalidated laws prohibiting interracial marriage 
(Adams, Bell, and Griffin 2007; Brown 2018). 
In the UK, legal protection against ‘race’ discrimination has 
gradually been extended and strengthened since the enactment of 
the first piece of equality legislation in 1965. The law is now en-
capsulated in the Equality Act (EA) 2010 and can be used to bring 
discrimination claims against individuals, organisations, private 
companies and public bodies.  
However, there are a number of loopholes in the UK law that 
allow for ‘racial’ discrimination. For example, Schedule 3 of the 
Equality Act 2010 permits the immigration authorities to discrimi-
nate on (inter alia) grounds of nationality or ethnic/national origin 
pursuant to a ministerial authorisation. Indeed, it could be said that 
the whole system of immigration control is racially discriminatory. 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Acts 1962 and 1968 were essen-
tially designed for the purpose to deprive certain Citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies, disproportionately Black and Asian 
people from overseas colonies/territories, of their previous com-
mon law right to live in the UK. The 1968 Act in particular was 
specifically designed to stop East African Asians settling in the 
UK. The Immigration Act 1971 replicated those injustices in its 
concept of ‘patriality’, which discriminated in favour of Citizen of 
the UK and colonies (CUKCs) who were born in or had ancestral 
connections to the UK (disproportionately White British people) 
and against those who did not. That discrimination was then re-
peated in the British Nationality Act 1981, which abolished CUKC 
status and gave the new status of ‘British citizen’ only to those 
CUKCs who were patrial.  
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In 2017 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination highlighted other loopholes. These include the fact that 
the UK continues to uphold its restrictive interpretation of the pro-
visions of article 4 of ICERD, which deals with hate crime (hate 
speech, incitement) – thus allowing greater freedom to the media 
in relation to racial prejudice than the Convention allows. The UN 
Committee also found an increase in racial prejudice in the media 
faced by minority ethnic groups, asylum seekers and immigrants, 
and lack of effectiveness of the Press Complaints Commission 
(PCC) (which closed in 2014) in dealing with this issue. For exam-
ple, the UN Committee raised concerns about the UK government 
allowing the media to use phrases such as ‘illegal asylum seekers’ 
– when in fact it is a contradiction in terms. The UN Committee 
further criticised the UK for the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001, which provides for the indefinite 
detention without charge or trial, pending deportation, of non-na-
tionals of the United Kingdom who are suspected of terrorism-re-
lated activities.  
The complexity of the legislative equality provisions and the cost 
of pursuing discrimination claims are additional barriers that ren-
der the law ineffective and inaccessible to most people (Selita 
2018; The Lord Chief Justice 2015). The UK has also been singled 
out (alongside Austria and Luxembourg) by the European Com-
mission for the complexity of discrimination laws which may be 
deterring victims of discrimination (European Commission 2016).  
Moreover, the wide discretion afforded to the judiciary may also 
contribute to discrimination through allowing conscious and un-
conscious biases to influence decision making. In fact, an analysis 
of the UK Ministry of Justice identified judges’ discretion as a risk 
of discrimination in sentencing (The Lammy Review 2017). Sev-
eral studies have found evidence of such discrimination including 
in the UK and the US. One large study of over 140,000 cases over 
13 years found that, within cities (30 cities covered) in the US, a 
defendant’s sentence could vary by up to 63% depending on the 
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judge (US Sentencing Commission 2019). Statistics show that this 
discretion contributes to discrimination practices of groups. For 
example, Black offenders in the US have been found to receive 
10% longer sentence than White offenders (Kerby 2012; Nanau et 
al. In review). Similarly, in the UK Black and Asian defendants 
have been found to receive considerably longer custodial sentence 
than White defenders, with Asian defendants receiving the longest 
sentences (Ministry of Jusice 2017). For example, for all offenders 
sentenced to immediate custody in 2016, White defendants re-
ceived an average sentence of around 18 months, and Black and 
Asian defendants around 24 and 25 months respectively (around 
33% higher sentence) (Ministry of Jusice 2017). An investigation 
conducted by The Independent found that between 2009-2017 one 
in four Black teenage boys convicted of homicide were handed 
maximum jail sentences (life); and not one White teenager was 
sentenced to more than 10 years (Abu 2018). An independent re-
view found that Black people and other ethnic minorities convicted 
of a drug offence are around 240% more likely to get a prison sen-
tence than White people (The Lammy Review 2017).  
These shortfalls in the law and procedure are among primary 
reasons for overt / open / institutionalised ‘racial’ discrimination. 
There are numerous cases of discrimination that can be described 
as ‘structural racism’ (United Nations 2018) and which demon-
strate that the legal protection offered by the current laws is insuf-
ficient. A striking example is the recent Windrush Scandal whereby 
Black people from former colonies who had arrived in the UK in 
the 1950s and 60s were, for example, denied health care and other 
essential services or even deported (Harewood 2018). Some of 
these people were left without any official record because the gov-
ernment destroyed their disembarkation cards in 2010 (Gentleman 
2018).  
Other statistics show that group discrimination is also prevalent 
in areas such as policing and employment. For example, in the UK, 
use of ‘stop and search’ powers by the police officers show there is 
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significant discrimination against people from ethnic minorities, 
with Black people being more than 8 times more likely than others 
to be stopped and searched (UK Home Office 2019; UN CERD 
2017). Gypsies, Roma and Irish Travellers represent only 0.1% of 
the wider population, they account for 5% of male prisoners (HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons 2017; Ministry of Jusice 2017). Similarly, 
Black people make 3% of the population, but make 12% of prison-
ers, and Black children make 21% of children in custody (e.g. (The 
Lammy Review 2017)). Statistics also show that Black people and 
other ethnic minorities are twice as likely as white English to die 
after the use of force by police officers and the subsequent lack of 
access to healthcare (United Nations 2018). In relation to employ-
ment, between 2010 and 2015, there was a 49% increase in the 
number of young people (16 to 24 year olds) from ethnic minority 
backgrounds who were long-term unemployed, whereas there was 
a 2% decrease among young white people (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission 2016).  
Internationally, in other developed jurisdictions, racial discrimi-
nation is similarly prevalent. In Europe, police violence against 
people from ethnic minorities is reported to happen regularly 
(Council of Europe 2012). For example, in Lingurar v Romania the 
European Court of Human Rights concluded that four members of 
a Roma family who had been badly beaten by Romanian police 
officers during a police raid were the victims of ‘institutionalised 
racism’ because ‘the decisions to organise the police raid and to 
use force against the applicants were made on considerations based 
on the applicants’ ethnic origin’ (ECtHR 2019). The Court con-
cluded that the authorities automatically connected ethnicity to 
criminal behaviour. The Court further stated that ‘Roma communi-
ties are often confronted with institutionalised racism and are 
prone to excessive use of force by the law-enforcement authorities’ 
(para 80). 
In the US, 1 in 9 Black men, aged 28 to 34, are imprisoned, 
compared with the average of 1 in 30 across the whole male popu-
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lation. Moreover, 1 in 3 Black men can expect to go to prison in 
their lifetime (Lyons and Pettit 2011; Office of Justice Programs 
n.d.; The Sentencing Project n.d.). In New York State, in 2017, 
Black people made up 58% of those being stopped and searched by 
the police; Latino people made up 32% and White people 9%. 9 
out of 10 of those stopped were innocent (e.g. not carrying a 
weapon); and in fact more White people (1.4%) than Black people 
(1%) were found to have breached the law (BBC Reality Check 
team 2018).  
Moreover, it was only recently that disturbing racial discrimina-
tion took place in health care/medical research. For example, the 
US National Institute of Health conducted a 40-year long, Tus-
kegee Syphilis Study, where 399 poor Black people were tricked 
into the study and, among other things, it was concealed that they 
had the syphilis virus and they were deprived of treatment (peni-
cillin) - despite the virus being deadly and transmittable to partners 
and children. Following a leak from the media, the victims of dis-
crimination merely received in apology from the then President, 
Bill Clinton (1999) (The White House 1997). 
Overall therefore, ‘racial’ discrimination laws are not sufficiently 
effective, allowing for misconceptions and stereotypes about group 
differences to feed into practice. For example, if a particular group 
is viewed as more prone to criminal behaviour, its members are 
more likely to be stopped by the police, making them more likely 
to get arrested, and more likely to get convicted than members of 
other groups. That statistical reality simply reinforces discriminato-
ry attitudes, creating a vicious cycle.  
What genetic findings mean for ‘race’ discrimination 
Many misconceptions and stereotypes about group differences are 
based on assumed genetic differences. In this section we review 
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what modern genetic science tells us about validity of these as-
sumptions. 
When considering racial discrimination for the purposes of up-
dating protection or views on differences between populations, it is 
important to distinguish two different claims that are often wrongly 
merged together. The first claim is that there are behavioural dif-
ferences between populations (or so called ‘races’) such as, for ex-
ample, in intelligence. The second is that there are genetic differ-
ences between populations - hypothesised to underlie the behav-
ioural differences. Both claims are notoriously difficult to test. 
First, establishing the existence of group differences is challeng-
ing because it is difficult to achieve representative samples – en-
suring that the comparison includes the whole range of each 
groups’ representatives in the same proportion. Moreover, the as-
sessment methods must be unbiased. For example, comparing the 
verbal ability of two groups using the same test would be flawed if 
one group contained a disproportionate number of non-native lan-
guage speakers.  
Second, having established a particular group difference, it is 
scientifically extremely challenging to determine the reasons for 
the observed differences. This is because true experiments with 
natural groups are not possible: participants cannot be randomised 
to conditions and extraneous variables cannot be properly con-
trolled. Any observed behavioural differences are likely to result 
from a large number of underlying factors and processes, including 
group differences in access to resources, cultural practices, societal 
pressures, as well as average genetic differences.  
A striking example of poor practice in group comparisons is re-
search that claimed differences in intelligence between Black and 
White people; and the claim that these differences resulted from 
hereditary factors. Much of such research has been shown to be 
flawed as it did not control for socio-economic conditions, educa-
tional opportunity, testing procedure issues and other extraneous 
variables (Ioannidis, 2005; Zeggini and Ioannidis, 2009). For ex-
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ample, any observed differences in such studies could arise partly 
because Black people have been segregated for centuries, limiting 
access to educational and other resources (see also (Kaplan 2015)). 
In 2000, the US Department of Health published a report which 
showed shocking disparities between Black and White Americans, 
including the infant death rate being more than twice as high for 
Black Americans, and the heart disease death rate, over 40% high-
er. Based on the available evidence, the report concluded that there 
are no known biological or genetic characteristics for these dispari-
ties, but rather they were due to complex gene-environmental pro-
cesses (US HHS 2000). 
When any behavioural differences between any groups are con-
vincingly established, these differences can only be interpreted in 
the context of two phenomena: (1) variation within the groups; and 
(2) the size of the group difference. For most human traits, varia-
tion within any naturally occurring group is wide. For example, an 
international comparison of school children’s performance in dif-
ferent academic disciplines, including students from many coun-
tries (80 in 2015 and 2018) demonstrated that performance within 
each country was widely varied (OECD n.d.). Within one country, 
the gap in knowledge and skills between the lowest and highest 
performing students of the same age was equivalent to almost 6 
years of schooling (OECD 2012). The same study demonstrated 
that the average differences between the countries were relatively 
small, even between the highest and lowest performing countries. 
This means that in the top performing countries millions of chil-
dren were performing worse than millions of children in the lowest 
performing countries. 
This point about wide within-group variability is often forgotten 
when group differences are discussed. Average refers to the statis-
tical mean of a given group – a sum of scores from each individual 
in a group, divided by the number of individuals in the group. Us-
ing such statistics, for example, research has shown that females, 
on average, show greater performance in some aspects of verbal 
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ability than males. In contrast, males consistently outperform fe-
males on some aspects of spatial ability, such as navigation or 
mental rotation of objects (Toivainen et al. 2018). However, these 
group differences are very small, and the variation within the 
groups is very wide. Despite this, an erroneous common under-
standing is that, for example, every man (or most men) has some-
what better spatial ability than every woman. In reality, millions of 
women outperform millions of men in spatial ability, and millions 
of men outperform millions of women in verbal ability. The group 
statistics tell us nothing about an individual’s ability.  
The same considerations apply to the hypothesised and estab-
lished genetic differences between groups, including different pop-
ulations. The starting point of any discussion of genetic differences 
between populations or any other real or hypothesised groups is the 
acknowledgement of ten basic facts about human genetics. First, 
all humans are related to some extent. Second, all humans are ex-
tremely similar genetically, sharing more than 99% of the DNA 
sequence. Third, the differences that do exist among people stem 
from millions of locations in the DNA – random variation accumu-
lated in our DNA through DNA copying errors and evolutionary 
processes. Fourth, this variability is present within all populations 
and new (de novo) mutations continue to emerge and spread in all 
populations. Fifth, there are generally no qualitative differences 
among populations, in other words, there are no genetic variants 
(form/allele of the same gene/genetic marker) that exist in one 
population that do not or cannot exist in another. In rare cases of 
discovering region-specific variants, they were present in only 1% 
of the population (Cheng et al. 2015; Rosenberg et al. 2002). This 
is also consistent with the finding that all individuals are carriers of 
a large number (more than 8000) of very rare/de-novo variants – 
not found in other people (Telenti et al. 2016). Sixth, if any genetic 
differences across populations do occur, they are quantitative – 
meaning that on average, more people in one population have a 
particular genetic variant than those in another population.  
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Seventh, many of the average differences in frequency of occur-
rence of a particular genetic variant across populations have not 
been linked to any specific human traits, such as intelligence, per-
sonality, educational or occupational outcomes or susceptibility to 
criminal behaviour. It is possible that some genetic differences do 
not relate to any meaningful behavioural outcomes. Each human 
trait is governed by hundreds of genes and thousands of DNA 
markers (polymorphisms), most of which have not yet been dis-
covered (Plomin and Deary 2015). Like any research field, genetic 
studies designed to find specific links between genetic variants and 
variation in traits have limitations, including small effects, limited 
sample sizes, limited genotyping, and liberal interpretation of re-
sults (Ioannidis 2005; Zeggini and Ioannidis 2009). All findings 
from such studies require multiple replications in independent 
samples before firm conclusions can be reached. 
Eighth, when particular genetic variants are linked to particular 
traits, they explain individual differences within populations, so 
that, for example, individuals carrying genetic risks for a particular 
disorder are more likely to develop the disorder than those who 
carry an alternative variant of the gene. The same variant may also 
contribute to the differences in the prevalence of the disorder 
across populations, if more people in one population are carriers of 
the risk variant. 
Ninth, genetic effects are not deterministic, so that, for example, 
having a particular risk variant does not mean that one would de-
velop an associated problem. Moreover, a particular variant may 
represent a risk factor for one trait and a protective factor for an-
other trait – a phenomenon called antagonistic pleiotropy. For ex-
ample, one mutation linked to blindness was found to have a pro-
tective effect for heart disease (Cheng et al. 2015). 
Tenth, the same genetic variants can express differently in differ-
ent environments. This means that removing some societal and 
economic limitations and pressures may negate negative genetic 
predispositions. Recent behavioural genetic research has demon-
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strated that even when people have identical genetic predisposi-
tions for certain traits, environmental factors, such as inequality, 
can enhance or limit these propensities (Selita and Kovas 2018). 
Most diseases, disorders and other traits result from an interplay of 
many genetic and environmental factors (Polderman et al. 2015), 
which we currently do not fully understand (Jing, Su, and Ring 
2014; Selita and Kovas 2018). The complex gene-environment 
processes unravel on physiological, neurological, sociological and 
psychological levels. Untangling the effects of specific factors is 
further complicated as they unravel over time and interact with 
each other. For example, a mother’s stress during pregnancy may 
lead to a cascade of negative genetic expression events for the de-
veloping baby, affecting multiple long-term outcomes. Further-
more, environments are responsive to our genetic predispositions. 
For example, siblings evoke different behaviour from parents and 
other people, which in turn may affect their development different-
ly.  
Findings from population genetics can only be considered in the 
context of these fundamental facts, as well as in the context of hu-
man migration and adaptation. Research has demonstrated average 
genetic differences between homogenous populations (e.g. (Jiang 
et al. 2013)) resulting from demographic events, such as migration 
and relative isolation of populations; genetic processes by which 
new mutations (genetic variants) occur, recombine, and spread in 
particular populations; and evolutionary processes, that lead to the 
spread of most advantageous genetic variants in a particular envi-
ronment (e.g. dark skin protecting from extreme sun exposure; 
light skin promoting vitamin D absorption when sunlight is limit-
ed). The observed population differences relate to average differ-
ences in the frequency of occurrence of particular genetic variants/
markers or combinations of markers (called haplotypes). These dif-
ferences have been used for genealogical/ancestry identification, 
and can be precise, if many markers are examined and very homo-
geneous groups are considered (Weiss and Long 2009). This is be-
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cause smaller and more isolated groups are less diverse genetically, 
through the processes of evolutionary adaptation and interbreeding 
– making determination of their origin easier. However, as de-
scribed above, average differences mean that a particular genetic 
variant or haplotype is more likely to occur in a particular popula-
tion, not that it does occur in a particular individual from that se-
lect population or that it does not occur in a different population.  
Research has shown that average genetic differences between 
populations are small when compared to genetic differences within 
any population / ‘race’. For example, a landmark study of 52 popu-
lations showed that within-population differences account for 93 to 
95% of the genetic variation; and across population differences, for 
only 3 to 5% (Rosenberg et al. 2002). Numerous studies have gen-
erated similar results (e.g.(Romualdi et al. 2002; Tishkoff and Kidd 
2004). These findings suggest that two randomly selected people 
within one population (e.g. Roma) can be more different genetical-
ly than two randomly selected people in two different populations 
(e.g. Roma and English). In addition, population genetic differ-
ences have been mostly established for specific genetic markers 
and haplotypes, but have not yet systematically investigated the 
interactive and cumulative effects of many genes (Jiang et al. 
2013). This means that any group information may be uninforma-
tive in regards to many traits in individuals. 
The small genetic differences found among the world popula-
tions are geographically continuous (Xing et al. 2009) reflecting 
migration of populations from their origin, Africa, where the 
largest genetic variability is to be found (Campbell and Tishkoff 
2008; Tishkoff et al. 2009). There is no clear dividing line of popu-
lations across the world regions. Although clustering of individuals 
is correlated with geographic origin, ancestry and even some tradi-
tional concepts of ‘race’, these correlations are imperfect, because 
genetic variation is distributed in a continuous overlapping way 
among populations (Jorde and Wooding 2004). Therefore, ‘races’ 
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cannot be biologically precisely defined (Hunt and Megyesi 2008; 
Weiss and Long 2009).  
For reasons outlined above, in relation to an individual’s traits, 
reliance on any ancestry or perceived ‘race’ or other group infor-
mation does not provide the necessary precision. Instead, the direct 
genetic assessment of an individual is necessary – a fact widely 
recognised in the growing field of personalised medicine. Howev-
er, where group information can be and continues to be used today 
is in the identification of ‘at risk groups’ – so that they can be pro-
vided with more preventative opportunities (e.g., medical tests and 
checks). This ‘at risk’ information can include information on av-
erage frequencies of risk genetic variants in different groups. How-
ever, this use will become obsolete when every person’s risks can 
be assessed – a likely possibility as the costs of individual genotyp-
ing is becoming very low.  
Until such individualised approaches become available to all, 
extreme caution is needed in relying on group information, for ex-
ample on health risks or response to treatment – when treating in-
dividuals (Chen et al. 2018; Sengupta et al. 2018). Some research 
suggests the existence of some average differences in the preva-
lence of some traits (e.g. diseases) across populations, and that 
these differences may be partly explained by genetic differences 
(Corona et al. 2013; Han et al. 2017; Wyss et al. 2018). A number 
of studies examined ‘racial’ differences in the prevalence of differ-
ent diseases. For example, one study (not using genomic data) ex-
amined risk factors in people with ischemic stroke, and reported 
that Native Hawaiian, and other Pacific Islanders (NHPI) and 
Asians were more likely to have diabetes, hypertension, dyslipi-
demia, and obesity than White people (Nakagawa et al. 2013). An-
other study reported that American Indians had a higher prevalence 
of some chronic conditions (Amparo, Farr, and Dietz 2011). How-
ever, without caution, applications of such information may bring 
more harm than good to people from ethnic minority groups 
(Bowser 2004). Whilst it is true that such information can be used 
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to take preventative measures, it can also be used to discriminate 
against individuals, for example, through high cost of health insur-
ance. 
It has also been claimed that some drugs are more effective in 
some ‘racial’ groups than in others. For example, it has been sug-
gested that medications for heart failure are less effective for Black 
than White people (Campbell and Tishkoff 2008). However, other 
studies showed that there are ‘no clear trial data to show any dif-
ference in effect between Black and White patients with heart fail-
ure’ (Taylor and Ellis 2002). Considering the large genetic diversi-
ty within Black people and that these genes would react differently 
to environments, claims that one drug works better or worse on 
Black people are misleading. Research has shown that, while there 
are geographic genetic differences in drug metabolising enzymes, 
they are of little use because current ethnic labels are insufficient 
and inaccurate representations of the inferred genetic clusters; and 
the distribution of drug metabolising enzymes variants differs sig-
nificantly among these clusters (Wilson et al. 2001).  
Taken together, the current scientific understanding of genetics is 
inconsistent with the concept of ‘race’. Therefore, ‘racial genetic 
discrimination’ is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms, because 
any population is genetically diverse. Paradoxically, the genetic 
science that has created so much controversy with regard to group 
discrimination when being highjacked by eugenicists, has generat-
ed new knowledge that can be used to combat ‘race’ discrimina-
tion. 
However, the same new knowledge has brought new challenges 
for justice systems. For example, our emerging understanding of 
which genes are responsible for which human traits, and the ad-
vances in genotyping (e.g., whole genome sequencing), enables the 
creation of DNA-based groups – for example composed of people 
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who have similar polygenic scores  for particular traits (e.g. per2 -
sonality or medical conditions). These new DNA-based groups can 
be created based on thresholds for particular risks or probabilities. 
For example, a group may include all individuals who score above 
a particular cut-off for the number of genetic variants associated 
with aggressive behaviour (or heart disease, mental health issues, 
etc.). The problem with this approach is that these groupings may 
be aetiologically as diverse (and therefore misleading) as the con-
cept of ‘race’. This is because the same behavioural outcomes (e.g. 
diseases, abilities) may result from different combinations of ge-
netic and environmental factors. Therefore, two individuals may 
have the same number (e.g., 10) of genetic risks for a particular 
trait (e.g., aggressiveness), but considering hundreds of risks may 
be involved in this behaviour, these two individuals may share no 
risks in common. The actual probability of developing a trait for an 
individual is very difficult to estimate because each individual will 
also have other risk and resilience factors that are not taken into 
account. 
Another way to create DNA-based groups is to aggregate togeth-
er people with only identical genetic variants for particular traits. 
This provides more precise distinctions than the current ones, such 
as ancestry, geographical attributions, or class. Moreover, DNA 
provides information specific to the time when it is taken: epige-
netic markers (e.g., methylation patterns) that are added to the 
DNA over the course of a person’s life can already be used to de-
 Recent studies across different domains of life show the importance of the 2
genome in prediction and prevention as applicable to an individual. For exam-
ple, polygenic risk manifested during primary schooling in lower cognitive abili-
ties, lower self-control, academic difficulties, and truancy, was associated with a 
life-course-persistent pattern of antisocial behaviour that onsets in childhood and 
persists into adulthood (Wertz et al. 2018). Many studies show genetic links to 
health, cognition etc. (e.g. (Trampush et al. 2017)). Polygenic scores found for 
years in education explain some variation in criminal behaviour in adults (2 
large-scale studies) e-RISK and Dunedin studies (UK and New Zealand) 
(Odgers et al. 2012; Poulton, Moffitt, and Silva 2015).
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termine one’s age, smoking status and health-related traits. In the 
near future, the use of such sequence-based and methylation-based 
groupings may become widespread because, individual genetic 
screening may become easier than socio-demographic profiling, 
and a more effective way of obtaining information on individuals. 
In fact, it may never be practical, for example, for insurance com-
panies, police force and other institutions to assess each person’s 
genome and to evaluate genetic and epigenetic processes in the 
context of each person’s circumstances. They may therefore opt for 
the ‘easier and cost-effective solutions’, such as placing people 
with certain combinations of genetic markers under surveillance; 
tracking in education; or gene-based insurance premiums. These 
new DNA-based groups are not ‘visible’ geographically or in terms 
of physiological features. Indeed, members of the same family may 
fall within different DNA-based groups. Such DNA-based groups 
could be viewed as ‘new races’ - adding yet another category to the 
already heterogenous definition of ‘race’. Updated laws are re-
quired to prevent the potential discrimination risks of such ap-
proaches.  
Overall, advancements in genetic science provide new opportu-
nities for the justice system to combat existing discrimination on 
the basis of ‘race’. However, the genomic era requires that legal 
professionals have sufficient genetic knowledge to apply genetic 
findings appropriately and to understand new risks of discrimina-
tion. Until our knowledge of complex gene-environment interplay 
becomes more advanced, we need to exercise caution in interpret-
ing genetic findings, when, for example considering genetic factors 
in sentencing and other contexts. The dangers of not doing so were 
recently exemplified by research which has suggested that even 
erroneously believing that one has a genetic risk can have signifi-
cant negative psychological and physiological consequences that 
are greater than any possible effects from the actual gene (Turn-
wald et al. 2019). 
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Conclusion and recommendations  
Statistics on the prevalence of racial discrimination show that it 
continues to be a wide-spread phenomenon. Group discrimination 
has a powerful corrosive impact on societies, affecting not only 
individuals discriminated, but all people, by virtue of the fact that 
it harms social cohesion (County Health Rankings and Roadmaps 
2015). In the genomic era, the risks of racial discrimination may be 
increased or reduced, depending on how findings are interpreted 
and on the five steps listed below.  
The existing legal protection in the UK and other countries has 
been found to be ineffective (e.g (European Commission 2016; UN 
CERD 2017)). The widespread discrimination that exists in the UK 
and internationally is underscored by historical myths and outdated 
genetic concepts. Recent advances in our knowledge on genetic 
differences within and across populations have not yet been assimi-
lated into the law. Beyond the ‘structural racism’ the law and edu-
cation are also ineffective in combatting subtle and covert discrim-
ination, such as discrimination in the recruitment of employees.  
The pace at which justice systems have developed over centuries 
is inconsistent with advances in other areas. We have evolved from 
primitive societies to exploring space, replacing organs, and even 
editing our own text of life, the DNA. Human knowledge has been 
reported to have doubled every century until 1900; every 25 years 
by the end of the Second World War (Fuller and Kuromiya 1981); 
and every 13 months or faster today (Schilling 2013). In contrast, 
the ‘1000-year evolution’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary n.d.) of 
the UK justice system has been slow. In fact, the UK legal profes-
sion and justice system have been criticised by leading UK lawyers 
/ legal researchers for having changed little since mid-17th century 
(Robertson 2006). This criticism applies equally to UK discrimina-




We propose the UK justice system can reduce discrimination by 
taking the following five steps (also generally applicable to other 
legal systems): 
1. The terms ‘race’ and ‘racial’ discrimination should be re-
moved altogether from equality legislation. The concept of 
‘race’ is not supported by current biological knowledge, but 
has been linked for centuries with inferiorities and superior-
ities. Moreover, the term is ambiguous in legal 
instruments / legislation – presenting barriers to the effec-
tiveness of laws. Reference to ‘race’ in justice may con-
sciously or unconsciously consolidate this concept in the 
minds of people, which provides yet another reason for 
abandoning the term.  
2. Instead of using an ambiguous term, legislation should pro-
hibit the discrimination against identifiable groups, such as 
nationality, national origin, skin colour, and possibly a new 
category – ‘DNA-based groups’, applied to people sharing 
specific DNA markers or groups of markers.  
3. The legislative exceptions which permit discrimination in 
areas such as immigration and policing should be removed. 
Provisions aimed at tackling group hate should be strength-
ened and the media should be subject to effective regula-
tion.  
4. Designing effective legal protection requires sufficient 
knowledge. Relevant genetic knowledge has been found to 
be low among advocates and judges, and views on use of 
genetic information in justice and for crime prevention, 
very divided (Chapman et al. 2018; Selita, Chapman, and 
Kovas 2019; Selita et al. In review). The level of knowl-
edge can be raised through short training programmes or-
ganised by the judiciary, the Bar Council and the Law So-
ciety, as continued professional development for lawyers 
and judges, especially those working on human rights and 
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discrimination. Genetic knowledge would also enable 
lawyers to understand and assess the validity of research – 
which is very important for justice. As has happened in the 
recent past, unsupported arguments (bad science) can 
spread, especially when they support particular agendas 
(e.g. the suggestion that there are differences in intelligence 
between ‘races’); and when they are in line with established 
views - which is particularly the case with ‘racial’ matters. 
5. Genetic knowledge has also been found to be low among 
the general population (Chapman et al. 2018). Increased 
knowledge in the population can help to combat outdated, 
discredited and ingrained views on ‘race’ and help to fight 
discriminaton. Including updated genetic knowledge in the 
school curricula, as well as training for a wide range of 
stakeholders (e.g., teachers, psychologists and the police) is 
an important step forward. Increased knowledge will also 
protect people from manipulative and misleading science 
reporting by the media. 
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